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Abstract—Non-malleable codes protect against an adversary
who can tamper with the coded message by using a tampering
function in a specified function family, guaranteeing that the
tampering result will only depend on the chosen function and not
the coded message. The codes have been motivated for providing
protection against tampering with hardware that stores the
secret cryptographic keys, and have found significant attention
in cryptography. Traditional Shannon model of communication
systems assumes the communication channel is perfectly known
to the transmitter and the receiver. Arbitrary Varying Chan-
nels (AVCs) remove this assumption and have been used to
model adversarially controlled channels. Transmission over these
channels has been originally studied with the goal of recovering
the sent message, and more recently with the goal of detecting
tampering with the sent messages. In this paper we introduce
non-malleability as the protection goal of message transmission
over these channels, and study binary (discrete memoryless)
AVCs where possible tampering is modelled by the set of channel
states. Our main result is that non-malleability for these channels
is achievable at a rate asymptotically approaching 1. We also
consider the setting of an AVC with a special state s∗, and the
additional requirement that the message must be recoverable if
s
∗ is applied to all the transmitted bits. We give the outline of
a message encoding scheme that in addition to non-malleability,
can provide recovery for all s∗ channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliable message transmission over a noisy channel is a
central problem in communication theory. Shannon [12] mod-
elled a message transmission system and, using random coding
argument, showed that reliable communication in the sense
of message recovery is possible as long as the information
transmission rate is below the channel capacity. A fundamental
assumption in Shannon’s model is that the channel is known to
the communicants. For Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMC)
the probability law for n times applications of the channel
is given by, Wn(y|x) = Πnt=1W (yt|xt) where W (yt|xt) is
specified by a probability stochastic matrix W labeled by
the elements of the input alphabet X (rows) and the output
alphabet Y (columns) , and x = (x1 · · ·xn) ∈ X
n and
y = (y1 · · · yn) ∈ Y
n. Blackwell, Brieman and Thomasian [2]
initiated the study of Arbitrarily Varying Channels (AVC’s):
communication channels with unknown parameters that can
vary with time and in an unknown way. A discrete mem-
oryless AVC (referred to simply as AVC in the sequel),
W : X × S → Y , is specified by a set of stochastic matrices
{Ws : X → Y|s ∈ S}, and S is called the set of states of
the channel. For an input sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n
to the AVC, the output distribution is given by Wn(y|x, s) =
Πnt=1W (yt|xt, st), where st ∈ S, t = 1 · · ·n. AVCs capture
adversarially controlled channels, in particular, the set of
channel states and their choice for each symbol captures
possible adversary’s influence on transmitted symbols. The
traditional goal of communication over AVC’s is message
recovery by the receiver. For powerful adversaries however
one cannot expect the message to be recoverable, and so
less demanding goals such as detection of tempering, have
been considered. Recently, Kosut and Kliewer [9] studied
message authentication in a setting where the set of states
includes a “no adversary" state in which transmission will
not be influenced by the adversary. This captures a real life
situation where the adversary may or may not be present. They
considered two communication goals: when the adversary is
absent, the error due to the stochastic matrix of the channel
that corresponds to the no adversary state must be corrected;
otherwise, the presence of the adversary must be detected.
Codes for detection of tampering in shared secret key setting
was first considered by Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloane
[8]. They introduced Message Authentication Codes (MAC)
that can detect arbitrary tampering in the form of message
substitution or injection of fruadulant messages. MAC is one
of the most widely used cryptographic primitives for protection
of communication. Kosut et al.’s model however does not
assume shared key.
In this paper we consider a yet weaker goal for com-
munication for AVCs called non-malleability, that prevents
the adversary from tampering with the communication such
that the decoded message be “related" to the sent one. Non-
malleability has been a widely studied goal in cryptogra-
phy [6]. More recently Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs
[7] introduced non-malleable codes (NM codes), where the
adversary is defined by a family of tampering functions, F ,
and non-malleable is defined as a relaxation of error correction
and error detection. NM codes are binary stochastic codes
with randomized encoders and deterministic decoders. Non-
malleability is defined by the following experiment: a message
m is encoded to a (randomized) codeword; the adversary
chooses a function f ∈ F and tampers with the codeword;
and finally the (deterministic) decoder is used to decode
the tampered codeword. Non-malleability requires that the
decoded message is either the same as the encoded one, or
results in a random message which is distributed according to
a distribution that is determined by the tampering function f
only (and is independent of the encoded message).
The following example elucidates the role of the function
family in achieving non-malleability. It is easy to see that
linear stochastic codes cannot provide non-malleability with
respect to the family F = {f(x) = x + ∆|∆ ∈ {0, 1}n}.
This is because for an encoding c of a message m, one can
choose ∆ to be the codeword corresponding to the message
1, consisting of all 1’s. By applying the tampering function
f(x) = x + ∆ to c, we have c + ∆ which because of the
linearity of the code, is the encoding of the message m + 1,
which is equal to m with every bit flipped, contradicting the
definition of non-malleability.
It has been shown that non-malleable codes exist if
log log |F| ≤ αn, for any α < 1 [7]. Using a random coding
argument, Cheraghchi and Guruswami [4] derived the lower
bound 1− log log |F|/n, on the achievable rate of NM codes
for a function family F . This bound depends only on the
size of the function family. An important family of tampering
functions is the Bit-wise Independent Tampering (BIT) family
in which a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n can be written as
f = (f1, . . . , fn), where fi : {0, 1} → {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , n.
Explicit constructions of non-malleable codes for the BIT
family that achieves information rate 1, were given in [1], [5].
We will also use non-malleable codes for the family of affine
tampering functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, where each output
bit of a tampering function can be written as an affine function
of the n input bits. Non-malleable codes for this family were
explicitly constructed in [3].
Our work. In this paper, we introduce non-malleability as
the communication goal of (discrete memoryless) AVCs. That
is, we require that the adversary cannot modify the commu-
nication in a way that the decoded message by the receiver
be related to the sent one: any tampering through the AVC
will result in either the sent message to be correctly received,
or completely lose its informational value. We model the
adversarial channel by an AVC {Ws : X → Y|s ∈ S},
and require that for any state sequence s ∈ Sn, the non-
malleability guarantee should hold. We focus on AVCs where
the input and output alphabets are binary.
We show that for such AVCs non-malleable communication
is always possible at rate 1. We show this by proving that non-
malleable codes for the family bitwise independent tampering
can be used for non-malleable coding over these channels,
achieving rate 1.
We also consider a setting similar to Kosut and Kliewer
[9] where there is a special state s∗, specified by the binary
channelWs∗ , for which we require the property that if used on
all bits of the sent codeword, allow the original message to be
recovered. The special state that we consider is defined by an
erasure channel where each binary input symbol is erased with
a constant probability p∗. We thus expand the set of possible
states of the AVC by the set of erasure channels. With this
AVC with the new set of states, we require the communication
to be non-malleable. We outline a construction that uses a non-
malleable code with respect to the family affine tampering
functions and a linear erasure correcting code, and provide
the combined requirements.
Discussion and future work. We consider non-malleable
coding for AVCs with binary alphabets (input and output). To
our knowledge non-malleability is the least demanding goal
for protecting a communication channel against tampering.
Binary discrete memoryless AVCs that are considered in this
paper are a natural starting point for the study of NM channel
codes.This is inline with the study of bitwise tampering func-
tion family in [7] that first introduced NM codes. The power of
the adversary in (discrete memoryless) AVCs is modelled by
the set of possible states. An interesting research question is
to capture realistic tampering adversaries for communication
channels as AVCs, and design non-malleable channel codes for
them. In [11], non-malleable codes for a family functions that
is inspired by the adversarial tampering of a communication
channel is considered: the adversary chooses the tampering
functions after observing some of the codeword bits (adversary
chooses which bit to observe). Considering a similar function
family in AVC setting requires more general AVCs that allow
the state of the channel for a particular symbol to depend on
the adversary’s observation of the channel. Other function
families that have been considered for non-malleable codes
could also be considered in AVC setting.
II. MODELS AND MAIN RESULTS
We use the following notations. A sequence (vector) of n
elements xi ∈ X is denoted by a bold symbol: for example
x = (x1 · · ·xn). The statistical distance (total variation
distance) between two random variables (their corresponding
distributions) X and Y that are defined over the set Ω, is
defined as follows.
SD(X;Y) =
1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
|Pr[X = ω]− Pr[Y = ω]|.
We say X and Y are ε-close (denoted X
ε
≈ Y) if SD(X;Y) ≤ ε.
A. Non-malleable coding for AVC
We consider a discrete memoryless AVC, W : X × S →
Y , with (discrete) input and output alphabet sets X and Y ,
respectively, and S denoting the set of possible states. The
set of states is corresponding to the set of stochastic matrices
{Ws : X → Y|s ∈ S}. The application of W to an input
sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n for a state sequence is
given by,
Ws(x) = (Ws1 (x1), . . . ,Wsn(xn)).
In this paper we consider AVC with binary input and output
alphabet X = Y = {0, 1}.
Let ⊥ be a special symbol that denotes detection of tam-
pering.
Definition 1 ( [7]): A (k, n)-coding scheme consists of
a randomized encoding function Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n
(randomness is implicit), and a deterministic decoding func-
tion Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥} such that, for each
m ∈ {0, 1}k, Pr[Dec(Enc(m)) = m] = 1, and the probability
is over the randomness of encoding.
A tampering function for a (k, n)-coding scheme is a
function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that is applied to a codeword,
and results in a binary n-vector. Consider an experiment where
a message m is encoded by the encoder, the codeword is
tampered by a function f , the decoder is applied on the
tampered codeword outputting a message m˜. Let same∗ be
a special symbol which means that m˜ is the same as m.
Definition 2 ( [7]): Let F be a family of tampering
functions. For each f ∈ F and m ∈ {0, 1}k, define the
tampering-experiment
Tamperf
m
=
{
x← Enc(m), x˜ = f(x), m˜ = Dec(x˜)
Output m˜
}
,
which is a random variable over the set {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥}, and
the randomness is due to the randomized encoding. A coding
scheme (Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with respect to F if
for any f ∈ F , there exists a distribution Df over the set
{0, 1}k
⋃
{⊥, same∗} such that, for all m ∈ {0, 1}k, we have:
Tamperf
m
ε
≈
{
m˜← Df
Output m if m˜ = same∗; m˜ otherwise.
}
,
and Df is efficiently samplable.
That is, Tamperf
m
is a random variable that is ǫ-close to a
distribution that is defined by the right hand side above, which
is commonly denoted by Copy(Df ,m). Non-malleability is
then rewritten as follows.
Tamperf
m
ε
≈ Copy(Df ,m). (1)
Our definition of non-malleable codes for AVCs can be
seen as a natural extension of non-malleable codes to include
probabilistic tampering.
Definition 3: Let W : X × S → Y be a binary AVC. For a
state sequence s ∈ Sn and message m ∈ {0, 1}k, consider the
random variable TamperWs
m
that is defined by the following
tampering-experiment:
TamperWs
m
=
{
x← Enc(m),y ←Ws(x), m˜ = Dec(y)
Output m˜.
}
.
This random variable is over the set {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥}, and the
randomness is from the encoder and also the application of
channel Ws(·). The coding scheme is ε-non-malleable for the
AVC, if for any message m ∈ {0, 1}k and any state sequence
s ∈ Sn, there exists a distribution Ds over the set {0, 1}
k ∪
{⊥, same∗} satisfying
SD(TamperWs
m
;Copy(Ds,m)) ≤ ε,
where the distribution Ds is independent of the message m.
Our main result is to show that non-malleability for binary
AVCs is always achievable. We show this by proving that a
non-malleable code with respect to the BIT function family,
provides non-malleability for transmission over binary AVCs.
Theorem 1: A ε-non-malleable coding scheme for BIT
function family is a ε-non-malleable coding scheme for a
binary AVC W : {0, 1} × S → {0, 1}.
B. Application to AVC with a special state
We next consider a setting where one of the states s∗ ∈ S
is a special state, in the sense that if that state is chosen for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the receiver will be able to recover the message.
That is in addition to non-malleability that is guaranteed for
any state sequence, we require the additional guarantee of
message recovery for a special state sequence (s∗)n. This
special sequence captures a known state of the channel by the
sender and the receiver and their goal of providing reliable
communication for that.
Definition 4: Let W : X × S → Y be a binary AVC with
a special state s∗ ∈ S. A (k, n)-coding scheme is (δ, ε)-non-
malleable with respect to W, if the following properties hold.
1) For any message m ∈ {0, 1}k, when the state sequence
s = (s∗)n,
Pr[Dec(Ws(Enc(m))) = m] ≥ 1− δ.
2) For any message m ∈ {0, 1}k and any state sequence
s ∈ (Sn \ {(s∗)n}), there exists a distribution Ds over
the set {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥, same∗} satisfying
SD(TamperWs
m
;Copy(Ds,m)) ≤ ε,
where the distribution Ds is independent of m.
The special state that we consider corresponds to a Binary
Erasure Channel (BEC). We thus extend the set of states of
the AVC W : {0, 1} × S → {0, 1} ∪ {⊥} to include BEC’s,
and use a specific BEC Ws∗ for the special state s
∗ ∈ S.
We sketch a generic construction that uses a non-malleable
code for the family of affine tampering functions and a linear
erasure correcting code. The construction first encodes a k
bit message using a (k,m) non-malleable coding scheme for
the family of affine functions on m bits, and then encodes the
resultingm-bit codeword using an erasure correcting code into
a n-bit final codeword for the BECWs∗ . We use a decoder that
correctly decodes the message if there are up to p∗n erasures,
where p∗ is erasure probability of Ws∗ , and declares failure
(error detection) for more erasures. When the state sequence
is s = (s∗)n, the erasure correcting code guarantees that the
message is correctly recovered with probability at least 1 −
δ, where δ can be calculated for the code. For an arbitrary
state sequence for the AVC that includes the erasure channels
and s 6= (s∗)n, the proof intuitively works as follows. If the
received word has too many erasures, the decoder will flag
detection. When the number of erasures is less than p∗n, the
decoder will recover an n bit string. As will be shown in
Section IV, the effect of this decoding is that tampering on
the m-bit NM codeword will be an affine function, that can
be protected against because of the property of the NM code
with protection against affine tampering.
III. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
Let FBIT denote the family of Bitwise Independent Tam-
pering (BIT) functions. For a binary string of length n, a
BIT function f ∈ FBIT is written as f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈
{Keep,Flip, Set0, Set1}n, where Set0 and Set1 overwrite the
input with 0 and 1, respectively, and Keep and Flip are the
identity (no change) and the flip functions.
Non-malleable coding schemes for the function family FBIT
has been widely studied. In fact, the fist construction of non-
malleable codes [7] was given for this family. The following
theorem shows that an NM code that provides protection
against the function family FBIT will provide protection
against any binary AVC.
Proof of Theorem 1. Define the set of elementary binary
channels to be {We1 ,We2 ,We3 ,We4}. corresponding to the
bit functions {Keep,Flip, Set0, Set1}. The proof has the fol-
lowing steps. First, we show that a binary channel can be
written as a convex combination of the four elementary binary
channels. Second, using the above result we show that a
sequence of binary channels of length n (that is applied to
an input sequence of length n) can be written as a convex
combination of the 4n channel sequences of length n over
elementary channels. Finally, we use the properties of non-
malleable codes for FBIT to show non-malleabilityis achiev-
able for any binary AVC. More details are given below.
Claim 1: A binary channel can be written as a convex
combination of four elementary channels.
We use Ws to denote a binary channel and its two-by-two
channel transition matrix. First, consider a binary DMC, with
channel transition matrix
Ws =
[
w11 w12
w21 w22
]
,
where rows and columns are labeled by possible inputs and
outputs, respectively. The matrix entries wij ’s are Ws(j−1|i−
1), i, j ∈ {1, 2} and satisfy the following:
0 ≤ wij ≤ 1 and,
∑
j
wij = 1, i = 1, 2. (2)
We next show the matrix Ws can be written as a sum of the
transition matrices of the four elementary channels:
Ws = α1We1 + α2We2 + α3We3 + α4We4 (3)
where the coefficients α1, α2, α3, α4 are non-negative real
numbers that satisfy α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 = 1. By solving
linear equations, we have the following relations,
α1 = w11 − α3, α2 = 1− w22 − α3,
α4 = α3 − (w11 − w22)
Note that we do have α1 + α3 + α2 + α4 = 1. What is left
to show is that these coefficients can be chosen to be all non-
negative. This can be satisfied if the following holds,
1− w22 ≥ α3 ≥ 0, and w11 ≥ α3 ≥ w11 − w22.
When w11 ≥ w22, we can let min{w11, 1 − w22} ≥ α3 ≥
w11 − w22. When w11 < w22, we let min{w11, 1 − w22} ≥
α3 ≥ 0. Thus such coefficients always exist, and so choosing
the value of α3 allows computation of α1, α2 and α4.
Claim 2: For a state sequence of length n, the corresponding
application of the The output of a binary AVC of length n with
a state sequence s on an input sequence x of length n, can be
written as a convex combination of the outputs of 4n AVCs,
each applied on the same input x. The AVCs correspond to
the 4n possible state sequences of length n over elementary
channels.
Using the notations in Section II-A, for a state sequence
(s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
n, we have
Ws(x) = (Ws1 (x1), . . . ,Wsn(xn)).
Using the results of Claim 1, we have the following decom-
position for i = 1, . . . , n,
Wsi = αi,1We1 + αi,2We2 + αi,3We3 + αi,4We4 , (4)
where αi,j are non-negative real numbers and
4∑
j=1
αi,j = 1.
This means that applying channelWsi to xi results in the same
output distribution as applying the elementary channels Wej
with associated probabilities αi,j . For the channel sequence
(Ws1 , . . . ,Wsn), the probability that Weji is applied to xi for
all i = 1, . . . , n is then
∏n
i=1 αi,ji . Using Ws to denote the
channel sequence, and its corresponding sequence of channel
transition matrices, we have:
Ws = (Ws1 , . . . ,Wsn)
=
∑
(j1,...,jn)∈[4]n
(
∏n
i=1 αi,ji) (Wej1 , . . . ,Wejn ).
The coefficients in the above decomposition are non-negative
and we have
∑
(j1,...,jn)∈[4]n
(
n∏
i=1
αi,ji
)
=
n∏
i=1

 4∑
j=1
αi,j

 = 1.
Claim 3: An ǫ-non-malleable code for function family FBIT
provides ǫ-non-malleable protection for an AVC {0, 1}×S →
{0, 1}.
Given a (k, n)-coding scheme that is ε-non-malleable with re-
spect to the function family f ∈ {Keep,Flip, Set0, Set1}n, we
want to show that for any state sequence s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈
Sn there is a distribution Ds that satisfies
SD(TamperWs
m
;Copy(Ds,m)) ≤ ε.
Define the following projection maps for binary channelsWsi .
ΦKeep(Wsi) = αi,1, ΦFlip(Wsi) = αi,2,
ΦSet0(Wsi) = αi,3, ΦSet1(Wsi) = αi,4,
where αi,1, αi,2, αi,3, αi,4 are given in (4). According to Claim
2, we have that
(Ws1 , . . . ,Wsn) =
∑
f=(f1,...,fn)∈FBIT

∏
i∈[n]
Φfi(Wsi)

 f.
Recall that the coding scheme is ε-non-malleable with respect
to functions f ∈ {Keep,Flip, Set0, Set1}n. That is for the
function f , there exists a distribution Df that satisfies
SD(Tamperf
m
;Copy(Df ,m)) ≤ ε.
We define
Ds =
∑
f∈FBIT

∏
i∈[n]
Φfi(Wsi )

Df .
Then Ds is the corresponding distribution for the Ws that
satisfies Definition 3.
There are explicit constructions of non-malleable codes
with respect to bit-wise independent tampering that achieves
information rate 1 [1], [5]. According to Theorem 1, we then
have rate 1 non-malleable codes for any AVC.
Corollary 1: There exist non-malleable coding schemes for
any AVC W : {0, 1} × S → {0, 1} achieving rate 1.
IV. A CODING SCHEME FOR AVC WITH SPECIAL STATE
We consider a linear erasure correcting code for the BEC
Ws∗ , with encoder ECCenc : {0, 1}
m → {0, 1}n and the
following decoder ECCdec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m ∪ {⊥}.
ECCdec: Let Gm×n be the generator matrix of the code.
Consider a received word y with erased bits given by E ⊂ [n].
The decoder ECCdec finds a subset R ⊂ [n]\E with |R| = m,
such that GR is an invertible a submatrix of Gm×n with
columns corresponding to R. Such submatrix will exist with
overwhelming probability because of erasure correction prop-
erty of the code. The decoder’s output is,
m˜ = yRG
−1
R . (5)
If the set E of erased bits is too large such that no recon-
struction set R exists, the decoder simply outputs ⊥.
As described in Section II-B, the construction uses a two
step coding. We first define the notion of induced tampering.
Definition 5 ( [10]): Let ECC be an erasure correcting
code with an encoder ECCenc : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n and a
decoder ECCdec. Let F be a family of tampering functions
over {0, 1}n. The tampering family G over {0, 1}m induced
by F and the ECC is defined as follows.
G : = {ECCdec ◦ f ◦ ECCenc|f ∈ F}, (6)
where “◦” denotes the composition of functions.
Let (NMCenc,NMCdec) be a coding scheme that is non-
malleable with respect to the family of affine tampering
functions over {0, 1}m. Consider the (k, n)-coding scheme{
Enc(m) = ECCenc(NMCenc(m))
Dec(y) = NMCdec(ECCdec(y)).
(7)
We will use an erasure correcting code with detection
(failure) error δ that can recover up to p∗n errors. Consider
the case where s 6= (s∗)n. If the number of erased symbols
less than p∗n (i.e., the adversary has not erased too many
symbols), the decoder will have an output. From the proof
of Theorem 1, we only need to consider the state sequences
that consists of bit-wise independent tampering functions. For
any bit-wise independent tampering function f over {0, 1}n,
let gf = ECCdec◦ f ◦ECCenc be the tampering function over
{0, 1}m induced by f , through the encoder and decoder of the
erasure code.
We now argue that gf is an affine function. This fol-
lows by noting that, (i) from equation 5 the decoder out-
put m˜ = yRG
−1
R , and (ii) a bitwise independent function
f = (f1, . . . , fn) can be expressed as an affine function
f(x) = xMf + ∆f . The combination of these result in the
induced function on the recovered word to be given by,
gf(u) = ECCdecR ◦ f ◦ ECCenc(u) = (uGMf +∆f )RG
−1
R ,
where gf is an affine function given any choice of R ⊂ [n]
with |R| = m such that GR is invertible.
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